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EMPRESA IN LATIN AMERICAN LAW:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

S. A. BAYITCH*

Modem needs for goods and services require an infinite number of
enterprises engaged in meeting demands on the part of consumers. In a
free economy these are established and managed by private individuals or
associations, or by the State or its various agencies with the profit or
social service as the driving motive. In other economic systems they may
be exclusively owned and operated by the State and administered by
public officials. In either system, the enterprise remains the operational
unit.1
Enterprises2 are characterized by two elements: the human element
represented by management and the employed personnel; and, the economic assets, material and immaterial. All, properly coordinated, work
toward achieving the goals of the enterprise. This basic analysis must be
supplemented by a significant distinction, namely that between the enterprise (empresa; hacienda; enterprise, Unternehmen) and the establishment (shop; plant; establecimiento; itablissement; Betrieb) .3 An enterprise functions as an economic unit and aims at economic results, be these
profits, or social services, while an establishment is a technical unit which
provides products or services, to be offered through the enterprise to the
consumers. It is, therefore, possible that a shop is at the same time an
enterprise whenever technical and economic functions coincide; and by the
same token, an enterprise may consist of more than one establishment.
(I)

EMPRESA: AN ECONOMIC UNIT

In either sense, an enterprise4 is, in terms of law, 5 an universitas
reram, an estate, comprising material and immaterial assets, operated as
a going concern by people, the management and the subordinate personnel,
and set up for a specific purpose. This unit was recognized by its ma*Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Miami School of Law.
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terial aspects as fonds de commerce.6 In Latin America, the transfer 7
of such jondos de comercio was regulated by a series of early enactments,
starting with Costa Rica (1901), and followed by Uruguay (1904), Peru
(1916), and by Argentine Law No. 11.867 (1934).8 In the meantime,
France contributed its law of 1909;9 later Liechtenstein (Civil Code, 1926)
went all the way and enacted the Einzelunternehmung mit beschrinkter
Ha/tung (art. 834 to 896 a). ° Extensive and penetrating studies increasingly called attention to the legal aspects of the enterprise, both in economic and social terms," and supplied initiatives which fitted well into
the ideas of the corporativist state in Italy where they left their lasting
imprint in the Codice Civile (1942, art. 2555 to 2562). Italian doctrinal
suggestions 12 and legislative patterns provided new ideas 13 for the overdue reform of the antiquated Latin American commercial codes, a movement which started to bear fruit with the Commercial Code of Honduras
(1950),14 and was followed by the codes enacted in Costa Rica (1964),
Guatemale (1970),15 El Salvador (1970),16 and Colombia (1971).17
Particularly strong are Italian influences on the successive drafts for a
commercial code of Mexico.1 8
(1) Concept. These new enactments supply a modern definition of
the enterprise as a coordinated unit19 of human efforts and of material as
well as immaterial assets, offering in a systematic way goods and services
for profit (Honduras, art. 644; Guatemala, art. 655; El Salvador, art.
553; Colombia, art. 25). Some jurisdictions adapted this definition to
particular areas as, for example, Mexico to maritime and labor law, and
Honduras to aviation. An earlier statutory definition may be noted. According to art. 2 of Decree No. 2.474 (1948), dealing with profit sharing
in Colombia, an enterprise is "any organization which, assuming risks
of an economic activity in pursuing an agricultural, livestock, industrial
or commercial process, accepts employees and undertakes to pay for their
services, regardless of the ownership of the enterprise, whether a natural
person or a legal entity." A more recent Chilean statutory definition is
offered in Law No. 16.250 (1965) i.e., an empresa is "any business,
establishment or organization owned by one or more natural or legal
persons, regardless of their line of business (commercial, industrial, agricultural, mining, maritime or others," but excluding leasing of immovables, income from movables, interests on credits and similar income.
The definition is supplemented by an enumeration of the assets
which make up the enterprise. The commercial codes of Honduras (art.
648), Guatemala (art. 657), and El Salvador (art. 557) list essentially
the same items: the establishment, if any; good will (cihentela y la fma
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comercial); the firm (nombre comercial) and similar distinctive marks;
furnishings (mobiliario) and machinery; leases; employment contracts;
merchandise; credits and other assets. Patents, trade secrets, exclusive
dealerships and concessions are included only if expressly agreed upon.
Colombia includes patents used in the enterprise; products are included
only in a mortgage on an enterprise (art. 516, sec. 2). The Commercial
Code of Costa Rica adds electrical installations, including telephones;
patents and trademarks; accounting books, including archives (art. 269);
designs and models; also, honors and other "rights originating in commercial, industrial or artistic property" (art. 478).
One jurisdiction, Colombia, has set forth the distinction between
enterprise and establishment. 20 While an enterprise is engaged in economic
activity "organized for the production, transformation, circulation, administration or safekeeping of goods, or for offering services" (art. 25),
an establishment is (art. 575), following closely the Italian model (art.
2555), a unit "organized by the entrepreneur (empresario) to effectuate
the aims of the enterprise." The law adds that the same enterprise may
have various commercial establishments while the same commercial establishment "may belong to various persons and aim at engaging in
different commercial activities" (art. 515). However, the difference is
of little consequence. It is mentioned only in connection with commercial acts (art. 20) ; but when the Code refers to the enterprise as a mercantile thing (art. 515 to 533), it uses the term establishment consistently.
The distinction also appears in the Mexican Federal Labor Law (1969),
which defines the enterprise as an "economic unit for the production
and distribution of goods and services," and the establishment as a
"technical unit which as a subsidiary, agency or other similar form, is
an integral part and contributes to the achievement of the enterprise's
goals" (art. 16). Here too, the distinction remains without consequence
as is the case with the commercial codes of Honduras (art. 655) and El
Salvador (art. 565).
The enterprise is declared to be a movable asset (Honduras, art.
646; Guatemala, art. 655; El Salvador, art. 555), except that transactions involving its immovable assets are subject to the respective provisions
of the civil codes. The minimum requirements to support the existence
of an enterprise are not established, except in El Salvador where an enterprise does not "lose its character because of a change in its elements,
nor by the lack of an establishment or permanent location" (art. 554).
Some jurisdictions provide for its termination if the operations cease during a set period (Honduras, art. 652; Guatemala, art. 662; El Salvador,
art. 562).
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(2) Classification. A brief survey will show the various crtitria by
which enterprises are classified generally in civil and commercial law,
and in particular areas, e.g., in labor, administrativez l or tax law. A
basic criterion is the nature of the activity, e.g., commercial, industrial,
mining, transportation, banking and - generally outside of commercial
law- agricultural enterprises. Enterprises are also classified by their
size, especially by the number of persons they employ, by their capital,
or by the quantity of their output.
Another criterion relies on the legal status 22 of the owners, i.e.,
whether the enterprise is owned and operated by individuals or associations of various types as, for example, partnerships, corporations, limited
liability firms, cooperatives and, recently, individual enterprises with
limited liability (infra 10). Again considering the owner, enterprises may
be owned privately or publicly; in the latter case by the State or any of
its agencies, including subordinate entities (e.g., provinces, municipalities). In cases of public ownership, an enterprise may take on various
legal forms: it may operate as part of the administrative structure, or
as a more or less autonomous entity, or as a corporation according to
commercial law. For copper enterprises in Chile, nationalized by the
constitutional amendment of 1971, the Presidential Decree of July 7,
1972 (D.O., July 15, 1972) has chosen the term sociedades colectivas del
Estado (art. 19).
Enterprises also may be mixed in the sense of being financed and
controlled by private and public means. In some Latin American countries mixed enterprises23 are regulated by special laws as, for example,
in Argentina (Law No. 12.962, 1964), 24 and in Mexico (D.O. December
31, 1970).25 In Peru, industrial enterprises with State participation are
classified in three groups: State industrial enterprises, established by law
with public funds as the only capital; associated State industrial enter.
prises, operating exclusively with domestic capital including at least 30%
of capital from the State or from its enterprises, provided the State has a
decisive voice in management and, finally, mixed industrial enterprises
as defined in the Cartegena Agreement (Decreto-Ley No. 18.900, 1971),
provided the State or its enterprises participate with at least 30% of the
capital and the State controls managerial decisions (Decree-Law No.
19.262, 1972, art. 10). It may be added that industrial enterprises are also
evaluated according to the objectives they pursue: national, social, economic or technological (ibid., art. 11).
Mixed corporations also appear in modem commercial codes, for
example, in the Commercial Code of Colombia (art. 461 to 468)26 and
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the new Business Association Law of Argentina (1972, art. 308 to 314)27
amending the respective provisions of the Commercial Code (1889).
Mixed enterprises are also defined in Decision No. 47 of the Andean
2
Group (1971). 5
Increasingly significant is the distinction between domestic, foreign,
and mixed enterprises, depending on the origin of their capital. The
Cartagena Agreement, 29 for example, defines as domestic enterprises those
established in a particular country and operating with at least 80%
domestic capital which fact must also be observed in the "technical,
financial, administrative and commercial management." Foreign enter.
prises, on the other hand, are those with less than 51% domestic capital,
while mixed enterprises operate with 51 to 80% of foreign capital, a
fact to be reflected in the management of the enterprise (art. 1). The
same classification was adopted in Peru (Decree-Law No. 18.748, 1971). 30
Within the Andean Group, Decision No. 46 (1971) 3 introduced
still another type, namely the multinational enterprise. There, foreign
participation is limited to 40% (art. 1) while investments originating
from domestic investors or investors from other Andean countries may
not be less than 15% of the total subregional participation (art. 11).
(3) Enterprise as a Criterion. As is well known, the commercial nature
of a transaction and, consequently, the applicability of the commercial
code rather than the general, i.e., civil code, may be determined by various
criteria. One is the mercantile nature of the participants in the transaction (subjective method). Under this criterion the participants may be
merchants in fact, or by registration, or by operation of law as, for example, corporations and. other business associations. The commercial nature
of a transaction may also be determined by the type of the transaction
(objective method), regardless of the status of the participants. Of course,
there are jurisdictions which combine both methods (mixed method) in
a rather complex way. The present trends indicate a preference for the
enterprise as the determining criterion, thus substituting the subjective
method of the merchant with the equally subjective method of the enterprise. An enterprise may become involved in two ways: one, the enterprise acts as a subject of a transaction acquiring rights and undertaking
obligations by buying, selling, etc.; the other, it becomes an object of a
transaction as a mercantile thing (cosa mercantil), demoted to a position
of merchandise in a transaction of sale, mortgage or lease.
The enterprise is used to determine the commercial nature of the
transaction in three of the four recently enacted Latin American com-
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mercial codes. This new approach was initially set by the Commercial
Code of Honduras which combined three criteria: that of merchant, of
commercial acts, and of commercial things. In each of these alternatives
the enterprise plays a prominent role. Merchants are defined through
ownership of commercial enterprises (art. 2, I); commercial acts are
those designed to "exploit, transfer, or liquidate an enterprise as well as
similar situations" (art. 3). And among commercial things the Code lists
"businesses or enterprises for profit and their elements, particularly the
name, equipment, trademark and patents" (art. 4).
In essence, Guatemala and El Salvador follow the same patterns. Both
have adopted the three basic criteria, with Guatemala identifying commercial acts by listing particular branches of economic activities (art. 2),
but retaining among commercial things the "commercial enterprise and
its elements" (art. 4, see. 2). El Salvador remains closer to the Honduran
model, both by identifying merchants as "owners of commercial enterprises" (art. 2, 1), as well as by characterizing commercial acts as those
"aiming at the organization, transformation or liquidation of commercial
or industrial enterprises," and adding "acts performed by these enterprises
en masa" (art. 3, I). Among commercial things the "enterprises for
profit and their essential elements" remain unchanged (art. 5, I). The
Commercial Code of Colombia shows greater independence but nevertheless uses enterprises as one of the significant criteria. In addition
to specific commercial acts enumerated according to the traditional
objective method in art. 20 (10 to 18), the Code lists as commercial a
number of enterprises, among them those engaged in insurance (10),
transportation (11), manufacture and marketing (12), warehousing (13)
and publishing (14), a technique reminiscent of the Mexican Commercial Code (1889, art. 75). Furthermore, commercial are also all "acts
of merchants related to commercial activities or enterprises" (art. 21),
but eliminating, among others, marketing of agricultural and livestock
products, provided they are not "processed by an enterprise" (art. 23,
sec. 3).
Conversely, the Costa Rican Commercial Code remains
outside of
this trend by simply covering all transaction regulated in the Code, including the sale of commercial and industrial enterprises (art. 478 to
489).
Enterprises not only display characteristics of a legal unit but also
develop an internal order of their own. This arises as a hierarchical
structure based on the ownership and on employment contracts, implemented by collective labor agreements and integrated into plant work
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rules (reglamentos de trabajo)3 2 containing "rules binding the workers
and employees in the performance of work in an enterprise or establishment" (Mexico, Federal Labor Law, art. 422). In addition to being a
legal microcosm in itself, the enterprise becomes involved in a web of
legal transactions connecting it with the outside world. The relationships
thus created are based on contracts, torts, or on proprietary, criminal
and other rules. Traditionally, these relationships are centered on the
person who owns and legally represents the enterprise. However, recent
developments have, to a considerable degree, abandoned this subjective
aspect and substituted the enterprise as the real party in interest, relegating the owner to a lesser, more or less collateral status. As a consequence, debts and credits as well as contracts binding an enterprise become so closely tied to it that in case of changes in ownership they become detached, to a considerable degree, from the person of the owner
and remain with the enterprise. The same phenomenon took place with
regard to employment contracts which, for the employer, have lost most
of their personal characteristics and assumed an objective relationship with
the enterprise.
These trends are clearly evident in recent developments in Latin
America.
(4) Transljar. The most common and, at the same time, the most farreaching transaction involving an enterprise is its transfer 33 to a new
owner. This affects not only the principals but also third parties connected
with the enterprise by contractual and other legal ties. Two methods have
been developed to deal with problems arising from transfers. These take
into consideration factors such as the enterprise to be alienated as a basis
for credit extended, also the enterprise as creditor of claims which have
arisen in its operations; and, still another, the contractual relationships
entered into in behalf of the enterprise in support of its operations. One
method is the precautionary method aiming mainly at the protection of
creditors. It provides for measures to make the transfer public and thus
gives creditors an opportunity to press their claims and to demand payment, even from the purchase price temporarily withheld. The other
method, the automatic, provides that the legal relations connected with the
enterprise run with the transfer, thus adding to the continuing liability
of the original debtor-transferor the new liability imposed on the acquirer.
The Venezuelan Commercial Code as amended in 1954 and the Code
of Costa Rica illustrate the precautionary method. In Venezuela, 3 a transfer involves the alienation inter vivos of /ondos de comercio, complete or
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in lots, thus terminating the business (art. 155). The alienation must be
published in newspapers thus enabling creditors to demand payment within
ten days (art. 155, para. 2). In case these requirements have not been
met by the transferor, both he and the acquirer are jointly liable for the
debts arising from the operation of the enterprise alienated. The same rule
applies with regard to creditors who filed their claims but received no
payment (art. 155, para. 2). The Costa Rican Commercial Code (art. 478
to 489) contains elaborate provisions. In essence, a transfer (including
judicial sale) must be made public with an invitation to creditors to file
their claims within 15 days (art. 479). The purchase price will be held in
escrow for 15 days (art. 481), to cover claims arising from the operation
of the enterprise which has been sold (art. 482). Creditors meet and decide
on payments (art. 483). Moreover, they may oppose the sale provided they
prove that the purchase price is 10% below the fair value (art. 485). Any
sale not meeting these requirements is "utterly null and void in relation
to third persons"; the acquirer will be deemed not to have paid the purchase price (art. 4 8 8 ).3s
Contrary to the principle of intransmisibilidad de las obligaciones,
recent Latin American codifications prefer the automatic method. Of course,
the codes require public notice (Guatemala, art. 656, para. 2), or the use
of a public (mainly notarial) act (Colombia, art. 526). The crucial problem involving liability for debts incurred in the operation of the transferred
enterprise was solved by providing that the debts follow the enterprise,
thus making the acquirer liable (Honduras, art. 649, para. 1). However,
most jurisdictions qualify such liability. Mexico's law of Maritime Navigation and Commerce (1963), for example, maintains the liability of the
transferor for six months from the registration of the transfer and, without
such limitation, in favor of creditors who have during this period voiced
their opposition to the transfer of the maritime enterprise (art. 129, para.
3). Similarly, Guatemala provides that the liability of the acquirer cannot
be contractually excluded (art. 660, para. 1); however, during the first
year from the publication of the transfer, the liability of the transferor
will continue and the transfer will have "no effect in regard to creditors
who have, during this period declared their opposition" to such assignment
(art. 660, para. 2). El Salvador provides for the transfer (transmisin) of
debts connected with the enterprise (art. 558, para. 1) to the acquirer
"without affecting the rights of the creditor to press them against the
original debtor," adding salvo pacto en contrario. The automatic method
has also been adopted in Colombia, but qualified by a number of rules for
the protection of creditors. First of all, the liability of the transferor will
expire after two months from the registration of the transfer, but only if
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creditors have been notified in writing, a notice appeared in newspapers,
and the creditor has not objected to the transfer (art. 528) by filing his
opposition with the office of the commercial register. In this case, the
creditor may demand security for his claim; if it is not forthcoming, the
claim may be enforced even if not yet due (art. 530). Debts not appearing
on the books or mentioned in the document of transfer will continue to bind
the transferor; however, the acquirer will be jointly liable unless he proves
his good faith (art. 529). In case the transfer takes place relying on commercial books and these show misinformation resulting in a lesser value
of the enterprise, vis-a-vis the price agreed upon, the transferor will have
to make good the difference, including damages, if any (art. 531).S6
The sale of an individual enterprise with limited liability (infra 10)
does not affect its existence (Costa Rica, art. 14), a provision implemented
by art. 478 to 489 of the Commercial Code dealing with sales of enterprises whenever an establishment is "sold in its greater part or completely,
and whenever the transfer is effectuated in two or more lots which surpass
the normal business of the establishment" (art. 484).
In most jurisdictions under consideration here, lease contracts are
listed among the assets of the enterprise (Honduras, art. 648 and 659;
Guatemala, art. 657, see. 4; El Salvador, art. 557, IV), and run with the
enterprise. Particularly extensive are provisions contained in the Colombian
Commercial Code (art. 518 to 524); it not only lists leases among the
assets of the enterprise but also establishes a lease interest in favor of the
acquirer of an enterprise operating on the transferor's premises (art. 516,
sec. 5). By contrast, the Argentine Law No. 11.867 (1934), dealing with
transfers of commercial and industrial enterprises, does not include leases
among the /ondos de comercio (art. 1). However, Law No. 15.775 (1960),
subsequently enacted and regulating urban leases, established an exception
from the general prohibition against assignment of leases covered by this
law in favor of leases involving transferred commercial and industrial
londos de comercio (art. 41), provided such cession was effectuated jointly
with the sale of the enterprise and the acquirer continues on the premises
the same or some other activity which does not basically change (desnatu37
ralice) the nature and aims of the lease.
The transfer of an establishment to another location without the consent of the creditors entitles them to demand payment (Honduras, art. 657;
El Salvador, art. 567), including damages (Guatemala, art. 665).
Besides the lease contracts just discussed, there are' other contracts
affecting not only third persons but the enterprise since, in many instances,
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they serve its long-term needs or interests. In general terms, Honduras'
Commercial Code provides that contracts will shift from the transferor to
the acquirer whenever contracts are related to the enterprise's activities
and are not personal to the owner, except pacto en contrario (art. 650,
modeled after art. 2558 of the Italian Civil Code). However, the third
party may terminate such contracts within three months from the date the
transfer was made public, provided such party has just cause; in any case,
the third party retains contractual claims against the transferor (art. 650,
para. 2). Mexico adopted, for maritime enterprises, the same basic rule
of subrogation of the acquirer, salvo pacto en contrario (art. 128). Guatemala follows, in essence, Honduran patterns (art. 658); El Salvador does
it verbatim (art. 559).
Of particular importance to a going concern are employment contracts. In some jurisdictions (Honduras, art. 648, VI; Guatemala, art. 657,
sec. 6; El Salvador, art. 557, VI) employment contracts, listed simply
among the enterprise's assets, are transferred with the enterprise as are
other assets. Detailed provisions appear in the Colombian Labor Code
(1950), 38 based on the proposition that the "mere substitution of employers
does not terminate, suspend, or modify the existing employment contracts"
9
(art. 67). Similarly, the Mexican Federal Labor Law (1969)" provides
that transfers of enterprises do not affect existing employment contracts
(art. 41); both parties to the transfer remain, during six months following
the transfer, jointly liable for claims accrued prior to the transfer, counting
from the day notice of the transfer was given to the labor union or to the
workers (art. 41, para. 2). The automatic transfer of "debts and obligations arising from employment contracts or from the exercise of rights
under this section [k]" from the nationalized mining enterprises to the
new Cor'oracirndel Cobre in Chile is guaranteed by the 1971 addition
(No. 17) to the transitory provisions of the Constitution. The Corporaci6n
is expressly charged with a full and prompt satisfaction of such obligations. 40 The same constitutional addition also provides that employment
contracts of copper workers "shall not be affected by any change in the
system" (No. 17, k, para. 1).41
Of course, where the transfer involves corporate entities or other
associations, the rules relating to business associations apply (Honduras,
art. 649, para. 2; Guatemala, art. 656, para. 2; El Salvador, art. 558,
para. 2).
The transfer of an enterprise imposes upon the transferor a limitation
on competition, 42 by prohibiting the opening, within five years, of a new
enterprise which "by its object, location:and other circumstances, might
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mislead the clientele" (Honduras. art. 653, para. 1; Guatemala, art. 663,
para. 1; patterned after art. 2557 of the Italian Civil Code). In Colombia
such limitation is restricted to two years (art. 563, para.. 1).
(5) Mortgage. Among other transactions involving an enterprise is its
use as a security (prenda, hipoteca).41 Being classified as movables, enterprises may be mortgaged, except that in regard to their immovable assets
provisions of derecho comrn, i.e., the civil code, apply (Honduras, art.
646; Guatemala, art. 656; El Salvador, art. 555). Elaborate provisions are
contained in the Commercial Code of Colombia. These provide that such
a mortgage is available without dispossession of the debtor (sin desapoderamiento) and includes all assets listed as belonging to the enterprise, except
what the Code terms activos circulantes. In case these have been included in
the mortgage and subsequently alienated or used up, they will be, according
to the 'basket principle', replaced by assets "subsequently produced or
acquired in the course of the enterprise's activities" (art. 516).
Particular provisions apply to some transportation enterprises. The
Mexican Law of General Ways of Communication (1950), for example,
makes amenable to mortgaging the "complete unit of an air transporta.
tion enterprise" (art. 362, para. 2), including the concession and other
permits and, except an agreement to the contrary, enumerated assets of
the enterprise. The transaction is subject to approval by the Ministry of
Communications. Similarly, the Civil Aviation Law of El Salvador (1955)
allows mortgaging of an aviation enterprise (art. 241).44
A review of previous enactments, for example, of the Argentine Law
No. 15.348 (1946), will indicate their impact on recent enactments. The
Argentine law distinguishes, with regard to enterprises, two types of
security: one, the prenda lila which, impressed on fondos de comercio,
includes installations, leases, trademarks, patents and designs, and additional assets listed (art. 11, para. 3), This provision is repeated in the
Commercial Code of Costa Rica (art. 478) listing the components of an
enterprise. The other type is the floating pledge (prenda Jlotante). It
creates a security interest in merchandise and raw materials of a commercial or industrial enterprise for short term credits, and includes not
only assets owned by the debtor at the time of pledging but also those
which "result from transformation (manufacture) as well as those
acquired by replacement" (art. 14), a provision adopted by the Colombian Commercial Code (art. 516).
4
(6) Other Contracts. Following closely the Italian Civil Code, 5 recent
Latin American commercial codes make a number of other contracts to
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run with the enterprises. Usufruct, for example, comparable to an
estate for years, is regulated in Honduras (art. 650, 651, 653, and 654),
Guatemala (art. 658 and 664), El Salvador (art. 564, 559, 561, and 563),
and Colombia (art. 533). Leases of enterprises appear in the codes of
Honduras (art. 653, para. 3, and 659), Guatemala (art. 664), El Salvador
(art. 564, para. 2), and Colombia (art. 533), following art. 2561 and 2562
of the Italian Civil Code. Colombia even regulates antichresis (art. 533),
under which the enterprise is operated by the creditor who is liable jointly
with the debtor for obligations incurred in such operation (Civil Code of
Colombia, 1887, art. 2.458).

(7) Privileges. Latin American laws do not grant the personnel privileged liens on the products of their labors. This type of security is available only to persons working under locatio conductio operis as provided,
for example, in the federal Civil Code of Mexico (art. 2644). Nevertheless,
a recent amendment to the Venezuelan Civil Code (1942, art. 1870, see. 4)
by the Ley de Privilegios de los Trabajadores (G.O. No. 26.603, 1961)
imposed a general privilege for salaries on "movable property of the employer," ranking fourth in priority. The Mexican Federal Labor Law
(1969) similarly grants workers' salaries preference over other creditors
in regard to "assets of the employer" (art. 113).
In some instances, privileged liens are established by law on particular
assets of the enterprise. Again turning to Mexico, the Law of Maritime
Navigation and Commerce (1963) gives a privileged status to "claims
arising from labor relations" against vessels (art. 116, sec. 1). Similar
liens, outranking other secured creditors, are given in aircraft to their
crews for salaries earned last month of employment (Argentina, Aviation
Code, 1967, art. 60) ; for salaries earned on board aircraft during the last
flight (Honduras, Civil Aviation Law, 1967, art. 209; Paraguay, Aviation
Code, art. 32), and without limitations by the Aviation Law of El Salvador
(1955, art. 247, e). The new Colombian Commercial Code (1971) grants
priority to claims for salaries of the crew earned during the last month
of employment (art. 1.905, sec. 2), ranking immediately after taxes.
Privileges in favor of personnel exist also in bankruptcy. The Mexican
Commercial Code (1889, as amended in 1943), for example, lists among
specially preferred claims those belonging to the "personnel of the enterprise as well as to workers and employees whose services have been used
directly during the last year prior to the bankruptcy" (art. 262, III), a
rule applicable also to maritime enterprises (art. 268).
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(8) Execution. The enterprise represents a valuable asset for the satisfaction of claims against the owner arising from the operation of an enterprise. In evaluating this possibility, it must be kept in mind that a judicial
sale of isolated assets of an enterprise might not bring their real value
when disposed of as a part of a going concern. A judicial sale of the enterprise as a whole may be unavoidable, unless there is a possibility that a
forced administration is instituted which may not only pay the debts but
also save the enterprise, including the jobs connected therewith.
These policies are reflected in many of the recent enactments. In
view of the "unity of destiny" Honduras (art. 647, para. 1) prohibits the
dismemberment of an enterprise through attachment of assets listed in the
Code (art. 648). Excepted are moneys, merchandise. and credits, provided
their attachment does not "impede the continuation of the activities of the
enterprise" (art. 647, para. 3); the enforcement of specific liens such as
mortgages, pledges and special privileges remains unaffected (art. 647,
para. 4). Possible is also the attachment of an enterprise as a whole,
resulting in a forced administration by installing an interventor to control
finances (art. 647, para. 2). The same rules obtain in El Salvador (art.
556). Maritime enterprises are amenable to such attachment in Mexico
according to the Law of Maritime Navigation and Commerce; the interventor will pay current expenses and keep income at the disposal of the
authority which ordered the attachment (art. 130). In a similar way,
Guatemala (art. 661) provides that an attachment may reach only the
enterprise as a whole or one of its establishments, through an interventor
with powers identical with those held under Mexican law. Nevertheless,
moneys, credits and merchandise may be attached provided this does not
interfere with the "normal functioning of the mercantile enterprise" (art.
661, para. 2).
The Mexican Federal Labor Law (1969) contains particular provi.
sions regulating the adjudications decided within the scope of this law
(art. 836 to 875), to be enforced against enterprises. The law exempts
from attachment "machinery, instruments, implements, and animals of
the enterprise or establishment, insofar as necessary for the conduct of its
activities" (art. 850, II). In case an enterprise or establishment is attached, the enforcement of claims will be by forced administration, conducted by an interventor with powers listed in art. 861, I (a to g). A
judicial sale of an enterprise or establishment (art. 867) requires a previous
appraisal and no less than two thirds of it constitutes the lowest acceptable
bid (art. 861, I). The proceeds will be distributed according to art. 874,
preference given to claims arising from employment.
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(9) Bankruptcy. The same policies find expression in bankruptcy. The
recently enacted Bankruptcy Law of Argentina (Law No. 19.557, 1972)
may be used as an example. Whenever an enterprise is affected by the
bankruptcy of its owner, the court has two alternatives: to continue its
operations temporarily (art. 182), or permanently (art. 183), the latter
according to detailed directives contained in art. 184. Concerning contracts
in effect (art. 185), the law continues employment contracts in spite of
bankruptcy, except that they remain in suspension for 60 days; however,
once the decision is made to continue operations, these contracts regain
their force (art. 186). In case the enterprise is sold, the acquirer is deemed
to be the bankrupt's successor. As such he is responsible for employment
contracts in existence at the time the enterprise was transferred to the
acquirer, but the claims which arose prior to the sale will be paid from the
bankrupt estate (art. 189). An enterprise may be sold as a unit; or all
assets disposed of in case the enterprise will not be continued; or the sale
may concern individual assets only (art. 198). The sale may be at public
auction or privately (art. 199, para. 3). Individual assets, however, may
be sold only at public auction (art. 202).
Many of these principles appear in the Mexican bankruptcy law
enacted in 1943. It foresees the continuation of the enterprise to prevent
"serious damage to creditors," provided the court finds both viability of
the enterprise and the social advantage inherent in its preservation (art.
201). The enterprise may be sold as an "economic unit joining its assets
in legal destiny" (art. 204, I). The sale also may be of individual plants
(establecimientos o sucursales), provided these may be operated separately
(art. 204, II), or of part or all of the enterprise's assets (art. 204, III),
and finally, of individual assets (art. 204, IV). In regard to claims of the
personnel for salaries earned during the six months prior to bankruptcy,
the law introduces a novel provision by granting such claims a special
privilege against the "merchandise, raw materials, and machinery belong.
ing to the bankrupt at the time when he was declared bankrupt" (art. 265,
para. 4).
(10) Individual Enterprise with Limited Liability. A business associa.
tion serves two main purposes: to accumulate financial means and, in
most instances, to limit risks connected with business ventures to particular
assets, monetary or in kind (aporte). In any case, such a type of business
presupposes a group of individuals, unless dogmatic scruples conjured up
by the one-man association are overcome. 46 Some disadvantages inherent
in corporate forms have been alleviated by the limited liability firm (sociedad de responsabilidad limitada), but not without introducing others,
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among them the exclusion of marketability of participations and, consequently, loss of the financial market.
A new type was suggested by writers, the individual enterprise with
limited liability (hereinafter individual enterprise). This novel institution
makes it possible to establish an enterprise as a legal entity with its own
property and with obligations limited to its assets, 47 without encumbering
it with a corporate structure.
(a) History. The individual enterprise 48 appeared for the first time in
Europe in the Civil Code of Liechtenstein (1926, art. 834 to 896 a).49 In
Latin America, the idea found strong support in Argentina where the
individual enterprise came close to being enacted. 50 During the discussion
of the law to introduce the limited liability firm (1929), subsequently
enacted as Law No. 11.645, a proposal was made to add a final provision
(art. 9) which would have introduced the individual enterprise. A complete draft consisting of ten articles was prepared in 1940 by the Buenos
Aires Chamber of Commerce and submitted to the Legislature which was
also considering a more extensive bill of 25 articles sponsored by Representative Rosito. In 1948, a draft bill, sponsored by Senator G6mez del
Junco designed to introduce an entitad juridica denorninada responsabilidad limitada individual, was adopted by the Senate. Even though all
further legislative attempts failed, the interest in the concept remains
alive. 51 The institution also received support from the Inter-American Bar
Association which at its 1957 convention in Buenos Aires adopted a declaration in favor of the individual enterprise; it was ratified by the
eleventh convention in Miami (1959), and confirmed at the sixteenth
meeting in Bogoti (1969).
The first country in the Western Hemisphere to adopt the individual
enterprise was Costa Rica. It appears in the 1954 Commercial Code S2 as
empresa individual de responsabilidad limitada (art. 9 to 16). A dozen
years later, Panama 5 enacted the individual enterprise as part of a law
dealing with empresas de responsabilidad limitada, one of which is the
limited liability firm, and the other the individual enterprise (art. 63 to
64), a copy of a draft prepared by Professor Ozores. 54 Most recently, El
Salvador introduced the individual enterprise in the new Commercial
Code (1970, art. 600 to 622). 55 It may be added that the commercial
codes of Guatemala and of Colombia did not adopt the individual enterprise, and neither did Argentina in its extensive modification of the Law
of Business Associations enacted in 1972.
(b) Sources. As indicated, the provisions regulating the individual
enterprise appear in the commercial codes (Costa Rica, El Salvador) or in
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a special enactment side by side with the limited liability firm (Panama).
Remaining gaps are filled by references to code provisions dealing with
business associations generally (Costa Rica, art. 16, 18, 32; El Salvador,
art. 616), or with limited liability firms in particular (El Salvador, art.
622). Additional provisions may be gleaned from subsidiary rules, i.e.,
those appearing in the commercial codes, in the civil codes, and finally
customs and general legal principles (Costa Rica, art. 1 and 2).
(c) Formation. An individual enterprise comes into existence by a
unilateral declaration executed by the founder (jundador, Costa Rica,
art. 10) who is at least at the particular moment the owner (duehfo,
titular). In it the founder sets aside and dedicates certain of his assets
to be the assets of the individual enterprise. These assets constitute the
property of the enterprise to be used in its operations. Thus the individual
enterprise becomes an "entity having its own autonomy as a persona
j urdica, independent and separate from the natural person to which it
belongs" (Costa Rica, art. 9). Consequently, assets dedicated to the enterprise become its property while the enterprise remains the property of
the founder.
The first question is who may set up such an enterprise. Only Costa
Rica provides an answer in the sense that legal entities may not establish
nor take over individual enterprises (art. 9). The Code does not require
that the founder be a merchant.
The enterprise will operate under a commercial name indicating its
limited liability, spelled out in full or in an abbreviated form (E.I.R.L.).
The omission to include such notice makes the owner liable for debts
(Panama, art. 63; El Salvador, art. 601, para.- 4). Costa Rica prohibits
the use of personal names (art. 10, a) while Panama and El Salvador
allow free choice (art. 63 and 601, respectively).
Since the main purpose of an individual enterprise is to limit the risk
undertaken by its founder-owner to particular assets dedicated to the
enterprise, a reliable inventory, is a necessary preliminary step (Costa
Rica, art. 10, e; Panama, art. 64; El Salvador, art. 602). The capital of
an individual enterprise may consist of money or it may be in kind
(aporte). A minimum capital is required in El Salvador (art. 606) and
in Panama (art. 67), except in cases where an existing enterprise is
transformed into an individual enterprise. In this instance the capital may
not be less than twice the amount of debts shown in the financial statements (Panama, art. 67). The capital may be increased or reduced
(Panama' art. 76; El Salvador, art. 609). Money must be deposited in a
bank in the name of the enterprise (Panama, art. 66, El Salvador, art.
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605). Immovables belonging to the individual enterprise must be marked
as such in the property register (Panama, art. 66, para. 2; El Salvador,
art. 603). However, contested negotiable instruments or unreliable credits
may not be contributed as capital (El Salvador, art. 604). Costa Rica
provides detailed rules for the evaluation of aportes (art. 10, c), borrowed
from rules applicable to business associations generally (art. 18, para. 9,
and art. 32). Panama imposes on the founder unlimited liability for
excess valuation (art. 65). In addition to the capital, the founder may
provide for additional security (cuota suplementaria, El Salvador, art.
613; reservas voluntarias, Panama, art. 68, sec. 6).
One way to establish an individual enterprise is by transforming an
existing enterprise into one with limited liability. In such a case, the
inventory must list all debts of the previous enterprise and the owner
remains liable for these debts without limitation (Panama, art. 64). In
cases of transformation El Salvador provides for opposition by creditors
of the previous enterprise (art. 601).
Once the inventory is completed, it will be included in the founding
declaration, executed in the form of a public (usually notarial) act and
filed with the proper authority. The declaration must contain the name
of the founder, the commercial name of the enterprise and its domicile,
its capital, the branch of business, duration, if any, the name of the
manager (Costa Rica, art. 10); also additional security if any, and the
monthly remuneration of the manager (Panama, art. 68; El Salvador,
art. 607).
As a rule, the individual enterprise exists from the moment the
declaration is properly filed and inscribed in the public register. Since the
establishment of such an enterprise amounts to a diminution of the
founder's assets, Panama provides (art. 70) that during thirty days from
registration (during which time the enterprise may not function, art. 69,
para. 2) any personal creditor of the founder or any other interested
person may file an opposition with the circuit court; the opposition may
be avoided by the founder through payment of the debt, if due, or by
giving security (art. 70). In case the court finds the opposition well
taken, it will order the cancellation of the inscription (art. 71).
(d) Operations. The individual enterprise is managed by the founder
or successive owner (Costa Rica, art. 10, para. 2), or by a manager with
a general power of attorney (apoderado generalisimo), unless the found.
ing declaration provides otherwise; in any case, the manager may execute
a power for court appearances. Changes in the management must be made
public (Panama, art. 69, para. 3).
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(e) Liabilities. The individual enterprise enjoys an unusual dual
status. As an independent legal entity, it owns assets and is liable for
obligations; yet, at the same time, it is owned by the founder or his
successor. This dual status is reflected in liability for debts incurred in its
operations. For these debts only the enterprise is liable, as expressed in
the Costa Rican Commercial Code (art. 12) that "only assets of the
individual enterprise are liable for its obligations without imposing upon
the owner any liability, since his liability is limited to provide the capital."
The same basic idea is expressed in Panama by providing that obligations
undertaken in the operation of the individual enterprise are covered by
the assets of the enterprise, including the capital, reserves and profits not
withdrawn by the owner, and by the assets assigned by the owner as
additional guaranty (art. 72).
Nevertheless, in some situations the owner becomes directly and personally liable for obligations incurred by the enterprise. As already indicated, the owner will be personally liable if, in dealings involving the
enterprise, he omits the fact of limited liability (Panama, art. 63; El
Salvador, art. 601, para. 4). His liability arises also in connection with
overvaluated aportes (Panama, art. 65); for improper withdrawals of
profits (Panama, art. 73); for fraudulent bankruptcy of the individual
enterprise; for misuse of the enterprise for illicit purposes, and for aiming
to defraud creditors or perverting provisions of the law (Panama, art. 74).
Essentially identical provisions are in force in El Salvador (art. 615).
The next point to discuss is the responsibility of the individual enterprise for the satisfaction of its owner's (non-enterprise connected) debts.
In this respect, Panama provides (art. 75) that creditors may not attach
assets belonging to the individual enterprise, unless they represent additional security (art. 68, sec. 6), or represent profits properly due to the
owner (art. 75). The same rules obtain in El Salvador (art. 612). If this
should not suffice, creditors may demand the liquidation of the enterprise
(Panama, art. 75, para. 2); El Salvador provides that in case of the
owner's bankruptcy, creditors may attach the enterprise and sell it or
impose their own administration (art. 612. para. 2). Costa Rican law may
be deduced from the fact that the Code provides for judicial sale of an
individual enterprise (art. 479).
To prevent improper depletion of assets held by the individual enterprise, withdrawals by the owner are strictly regulated. Costa Rica allows
withdrawals of profits only after inventory and if the annual financial
statement shows a profit (art. 11). Panama also prohibits any withdrawal
of funds, except the owner's monthly remuneration as established in the
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founding declaration (art. 68, sec. 8), and of liquid profits properly
shown. The owner and the manager are personally and jointly liable for a
distribution of profits in violation of these rules (art. 73).
In El Salvador, individual enterprises must report their profits and
losses to the Inspecci6n de Sociedades Mercantiles y Sindicatos (art. 617).
(f) Transfer. Being independent legal entities, individual enterprises
may be transferred inter vivos as well as mortis causa. According to the
Costa Rican Commercial Code (art. 14) the "sale of a commercial enterprise, of a shop (taller), of the business or of the activity in which [an
individual enterprise] engages, does not necessarily result in the liquidation
of the enterprises." Panama provides more elaborate rules for both types
of transfer (art. 82): inter vivos transfers must be reduced to a public
document, properly inscribed in the public register and made public; when
a case of mortis causa arises, provisions regarding succession apply (art.
82. para. 2). In case that two or more persons acquire the same individual
enterprise, they may continue operating it as an individual enterprise or
transform it into another type (art. 82, para. 5). The acquisition of an
individual enterprise either way has no effect in relation to third persons
prior to 30 days from registration of the transfer. During this time they
may declare their opposition to the transfer (art. 83) in a way similar to
the one previously mentioned (art. 70 and 71).
Transfers of individual enterprises and the effects thereof are, if there
is not particular provision applicable, governed by rules applicable to
transfer of enterprises generally (supra 4). Costa Rica provides (art. 479)
that transfers for consideration (titulo oneroso) must be made by public
notice inviting creditors to file their claims (art. 478). The price will not
be paid prior to 15 days from the date of the notice (art. 480). The pertinent provisions of the Commercial Code of El Salvador (art. 558) have
already been summarized.
(g) Termination. The duration of an individual enterprise may be set
forth in the founding declaration (Costa Rica, art. 10, e). The enterprise
may also be liquidated voluntarily (Costa Rica, art. 15; Panama, art. 77;
El Salvador, art. 618) or for reasons established by law (Panama, art. 78;
El Salvador, art. 619). An individual enterprise must be liquidated because
of bankruptcy, but this will not affect the other assets of the owner. Costa
Rica qualifies this rule by providing that in case the bankruptcy was
culpable o fraudulenta, the court will order attachment of the owner's other
assets (art. 16 and 960). Panama grants (art. 81) creditors of the individ.
ual enterprise preferential treatment over the owner's personal creditors.
However, the individual enterprise need not be liquidated, subject to the
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right of personal creditors to take advantage of provisions contained in art.
75, namely to demand liquidation of the enterprise (art. 75, para. 2). On
the other hand, El Salvador demands liquidation of a bankrupt's individual
enterprise even for such cause as the bankruptcy of another individual
enterprise owned by the same person (art. 619).
The owner's bankruptcy will result in the liquidation of the individual
enterprise in Panama (art. 77, see. 2), a rule not adopted by El Salvador.
There, creditors may attach the individual enterprise in order to sell it or
to take over its management (art. 612, para. 2).
(h) Taxation. In this respect, only Costa Rica provides a rule (art. 9,
para. 2), namely that for purposes of the income tax an individual enterprise and its income shall be included in the personal tax declaration of
the owner. It appears that the same rule prevails in other jurisdictions.
Equally common is the position that, not being a corporation, an individual
enterprise is not subject to corporate taxes.
As promising and inviting as this novel institution may appear, its
legislative acceptance in Latin America is limited to three Central American
republics. And even there, the actual adoption of the individual enterprise
by'the business world is disappointing. In Costa Rica the number of registered individual enterprises is reported to be nine, and in Panama it is
estimated at less than half a dozen. In El Salvador there is none. These
numbers alone, of course, do not tell the whole story without supporting
data disclosing the capital and the income. In any case, it seems that the
complexity of the institution offsets the hoped for advantages over the
corporate type of business associations. Apparently the more manageable
limited liability firm, available throughout Latin America, including the
three Central American countries, provides a more acceptable alternative.
In Costa Rica, for example, corporations compete successfully not only
with limited liability firms but also with individual enterprises because of
tax advantages they offer. While both, the limited liability firm and the
individual enterprise, must keep their assets and activities wide open for
all kinds of taxation, corporations with their bearer shares and other
advantages, particularly under the 1964 Commercial Code, offer an
unparalleled way to avoid taxation of income. This accounts not only for
the surprisingly great number of limited liability firms that went corporate
but also for the lack of attraction left to individual enterprises.
(II)

EMPRESA: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC INSTITUTION

Until early in this century, enterprises represented a means to earn
profits in a free market by providing goods and services in response to
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consumers' needs. Changes originated from two quarters: from inside the
enterprise where the personnel, increasingly conscious of its role and
effectively organized, clamored for its part, both in terms of profits and
in managerial prerogatives and, from the outside, from the State which
with increasing intensity intervened not only in matters economic generally, but also in disputes between labor and management. 56
Changes affecting enterprises as a result of intervention by the State
take on various forms, among them, nationalization (estatizacin, Verstaatlichung, no English term yet available). These takeovers by the State may
amount to a complete integration of enterprises--with insignificant exceptions-into the State machinery, to be managed as a public service subordinated to the central administrative arm (Soviet Union, Cuba). Another
approach is that of mixed enterprises operating in vital areas of the
national economy as ambivalent entities relying on both public and private
capital and combining public service with profit. In both situations, the
general climate of economic activity is, to a considerable degree, determined by alternatives. Either the economy is prevailingly State-owned,
controlled and operated, or the so-called private sector, where private capital and private initiative remain in essence free, covers a significant
segment of the economy or even competes with State operated enterprises.
While the structure and activities of the various types of State controlled enterprises have been given considerable attention, studies on the
status of personnel in such "administrative" economies have been lacking.
This aspect shall be the approach in this part of the present inquiry.
Managerial authority based on the combination of ownership and of
employment contracts gradually underwent significant changes. The personnel commenced their attack against the most inviting item, profits, and
avoided, at least temporarily, challenging managerial prerogatives and
assuming of business risks (infra 11). In order to take care of their interests, personnel initially designated representatives vested with growing,
statutorily conferred powers (infra 12). In addition to unions, personnel
is, at least in one Latin American jurisdiction, recognized as a legal entity
(infra 13). From this vantage point only one step was needed to bring the
representatives into the managing bodies to share in their functions (infra
14). Finally, in some jurisdictions there began the takeover of enterprises
by its personnel, or by the State acting in behalf of the personnel or in the
"interest of the people" (infra 15). At this stage, the State becomes totally
involved in social and economic matters and any imaginable scheme may
be carried out at its pleasure.
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57
The function of the enterprise as a socio-economic institution was
formulated in art. 63 of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 1967:

The State guarantees the enterprise as a community of work
whose working factors (elementos instrumentales) should be
subordinated to human elements; and all these subordinated to
the common weal.
The social organization of the enterprise will be developed without prejudice to the authority and unity of management.
(11) Profit Sharing. Traditionally, the profits of an enterprise belong
to the individual or associative owners, private or public. In regard to the
personnel, their earnings are legally unrelated to the profits since they are
based on employment and not on partnership contracts. Therefore, the
sharing of profits 8 represents a significant innovation expressed as inter.
American policy as well as a constitutional tenet. The Inter-American
Charter of Social Guarantees, adopted in BogotA in 1948, recognized in
art. 11 the workers' "right to share in profits of the enterprises in which
they work, on the basis of justice in a way and amount in accordance with
the requirements prescribed by law." Starting with the Mexican Constitution of 1917, the right to share in the profits was granted to personnel
employed in "all agricultural, commercial, industrial, and mining enterprises" (art. 123, VI). The same principle was proclaimed in the 1957
Brazilian Constitution among the directives to guide labor legislation
calling for "obligatory and direct participation of the worker in the
profits of the enterprise," a promise never fulfilled. Ecuador also included
profit sharing in both the 1946 (art. 185) and the 1967 (art. 64) constitutions, specifying even the percentage (10%). Similarly, Bolivia's 1967
Constitution-as did the one of 1964-foresees a law to regulate "bonuses,
premiums, and other systems of sharing in the profits of an enterprise"
(art. 157). Argentina adopted profit sharing by a constitutional amendment (1957, art. 14, para. 2) as one of the protective measures in favor
of workers, the "participation in the profits of enterprises, with control
over production and cooperation in the management," but without legislative follow-up.
In pursuance of such constitutional initiatives or without them, a
number of Latin American countries have adopted laws introducing profit
sharing. Some Mexican states enacted such laws immediately following
the adoption of the 1917 Constitution. When labor legislation became a
matter of federal legislation, the first federal Labor Law (1931) dealt
with profit sharing on the nationwide level (art. 100). Following the
constitutional amendment adopted in 1962 (art. 123, IX), the new Federal

EMPRESA IN LATIN AMERICAN LAw

Labor Law (1969) 59 regulates profit sharing in art. 117 to 131. Peru's
1933 Constitution expressly favored "a regime of participation by employees and workers in the profits of enterprises" (art. 45) ; the principle
was implemented by Law No. 10.908 (1949) and a Decreto Supremo of
December 23, 1949,60 subsequently superseded by Law No. 11.672 (1951).
Extensive legislation enacted in 1970 and 1971 now regulates profit sharing in industrial, fishing, mining, and telecommunications enterprises.61
The Labor Code of Chile (1945) contains elaborate provisions on profit
sharing, distinguishing between sharing by employees and workers (art.
146 to 153, and 405 to 409, implemented by Resoluci6n No. 1.030 of 1949,
art. 104 to 123).62 Venezuela 3 introduced profit sharing in 1936 and
developed it by Decree of December 17, 1938, amended in 1941 and
1943; presently, the 1936 law applies as amended in 1945, with modifications added in 1945, 1947, 1961, and 1962. The latter two enactments
are summarized elsewhere in this study. Bolivia set by Decree-Law No. 6
(1943), affirmed by Law of November 22, 1945, the participation at 25%
of the profits, but replaced it later with an extensive system of bonuses.
Ecuador enacted profit sharing by a decree-law (1948) subsequently
included in the Labor Code as recodified in 1961 (art. 90 to 101, amended
in 1964 and 1970). Most recently, profit sharing was made compulsory in
the Dominican Republic by Law No. 288 (1972).
In other Latin American republics profit sharing remains optional as,
for example, in Argentina (art. 4 of the Law on the regime of payment
of salaries, Law No. 18.596, 1970, 2 Law. Am. 201, 1971), in Panama
(Labor Code, 1947, art. 181 and 184), and in Guatemala (Labor Code,
1947, art. 92, para. 2). In Uruguay, profit sharing is limited to the Frigorzlico Nacional (Law No. 12.475, 1957). Colombia enacted in 1948 an
elaborate decree (No. 2, 1948); however, the subsequent Substantive
Labor Law (1950) made profit sharing optional, with the proviso that the
personnel may never assume business risks (art. 28).
Not all enterprises are required to share profits with their personnel.
Most enactments include commercial, industrial, and mining enterprises;
others cover personnel engaged in agriculture and fishing. In most instances, a minimum number of employed persons is required. And there
must be profits to share; in Peru, for example, the minimum amount of
profits was decisive (50,000 soles, art. 1, Decree-Law of 1948). But even
within this limited coverage, further exceptions are made. Mexico, for
example, exempts (art. 125), among others, new enterprises, humanitarian
institutions, and enterprises with low capital. Exemptions under the recent
64
enactment in the Dominican Republic (art. 2) are summarized elsewhere.
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The basic question in profit sharing is, of course, how to determine the
amount to be distributed. This is done in two ways. One is to use legally
established bookkeeping procedures. In Venezuela, for example, liquid
profits are determined by taking gross income, less costs and interest for
the invested capital (no more than 6%), less 10% from this amount for
the reserve fund (art. 79). The other way is to use profits accepted for
income tax purposes as, for example, in Ecuador (art. 96), Chile (art.
150), and Mexico (art. 120, para. 2), the latter even offering a possibility
to both sides to contest such basis (art. 121).
The amount of profits set aside for the benefit of the personnel is,
in most jurisdictions, determined in percentages. These vary from 10%
(Chile, art. 405; Venezuela, art. 760; Dominican Republic, art. 1), to
15% (Ecuador, art. 90), to 20% (Chile, art. 146, for employees), to 25%
(Bolivia, art. 1, 1943), and to 30% (Peru, art. 1, 1948). Presently, the
percentage in Peru is 25% in industrial (art. 21); 20% in fishing (art.
70), 10% in mining, and 25% in telecommunications enterprises (art. 98).
Mexico, on the other hand, took a flexible position by providing that the
percentage be determined by the Comisi~n Nacional para la Participaci6n
de los Trabajadores en las Utilidades de las Empresas (art. 117), organized as a tripartite commission with equal representations of management and labor (the latter represented by the union), with a voting
government official presiding (art. 579). The Comisidn will set percentages after having determined the "general conditions of the national
economy" (art. 118).
Not all members of the personnel qualify for a share in the profits.
Some are denied participation because of their high positions in the
enterprise, others because of their provisional employment status. Mexico,
for example, excludes, among others, directors, managers, and other
employees in positions of trust with high salaries (art. 127). High
earnings may limit, in some jurisdictions, the available share (Ecuador,
art. 90, para. 2; Chile, art. 146, para. 2).
The amount of the share due to individual members of the personnel
is allocated according to three criteria. One is based on straight propor.
tion to the salary earned (Venezuela, art. 77; Ecuador, art. 90, para. 2).
The other is seniority, usually combined with proportion (Chile, art.
148); there the share (20%) is allocated one half in proportion to
earnings and the other half with regard to years of service. Mexico uses
the same criteria, but in another way: half of the fund is divided among
all participants in proportion to their working days while the other half
is allocated proportionally to annual earnings (art. 123); detailed rules
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shall be worked out by an enterprise committee composed of representatives of the personnel and management (art. 125). An unusual method
was introduced in Colombia in 1948. It relied on 100 points (cuotas),
alloted according to the family status, depending on the number of
dependents (art. 14), by seniority (art. 15), by reliability (art. 16), and
efficiency in work (art. 17). The same cuotas appeared in the 1948
Peruvian law (art. 4).
The intended recipient of the share in profits is, of course, the
personnel. In jurisdictions adopting the unqualified method, the share
is paid directly to the personnel in cash at legally established dates
(Ecuador, art. 97; Mexico, art. 124). However, a much greater number
of jurisdictions adhere to a qualified method. In some of them, part of
the share is deposited in the worker's account in a government approved
financial institution, subject to detailed provisions regarding withdrawals
(Colombia, 1948, art. 20). In Venezuela, 75% of the share is paid
directly to the personnel and 25% deposited in the beneficiary's account
(art. 81) from which he may draw in situations listed in art. 82 and
83, for example, for the purchase of housing, in case of invalidity, or in
case of death, by his heirs. In Ecuador (art. 90, as amended in 1970)
10% of the total 15% goes directly to the worker while the remaining
5% belongs to the union established in the same enterprise, to be
distributed among workers with families, regardless of whether they are
members or not. In case there is no union, the 5% will be deposited in
the Banco Central to be used under orders of the Inspector de Trabajo.
A similar arrangement is found in Chilean labor law where the share due
to industrial workers (art. 384) belongs half to the union (art. 408) and
half directly to the worker (art. 409), a rule applicable also to copper
workers (Regulation No. 1.030, 1950, art. 114 to 121). In some jurisdictions (e.g., Venezuela, art. 84; Dominican Republic, art. 5) part of the
share may be used to finance housing.
The share in profits due to the personnel is generally considered
as part of the salary and, consequently, partakes of privileges designed
for its protection, particularly against garnishment. Venezuela has enacted
a law to make sure that such protection is forthcoming (G.O. No. 27.015,
1962). It provides that no execution may be granted on shares of profits
accruing to workers by law or by contract, including various kinds of
bonuses, both legal and contractual, except in satisfaction of judgments
for support when half of the amount due as shares or bonuses may be
garnished.
In addition to direct payments combined with deposits and union
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participation, a third method has evolved, namely the investment of a
part of the profits in shares (acciones) or other participations in the
enterprise. However, there is considerable variety in methods to effectuate
the underlying idea of making the personnel at least part owner of the
enterprise by reinvesting their earnings. In addition to acquisition of
general shares of the corporate enterprise, special shares have been introduced (acciones de trabajo). They appear, for example, in the Chilean
Labor Code (art. 405, para. 3) and relieve such enterprise from the duty
to share profits, provided the enterprise is organized as a corporation
with 6% paid-in capital in such shares, to be held by the labor union.
On a much larger scale was this idea adopted in Peru with the difference
that worker's shares are not held by labor unions but by the comunidades
(infra 14) operating in the enterprise. The complex structure set up by
a series of enactments passed in 1970 and 1971 for industrial, fishing,
mining, and telecommunication enterprises may be summarized as follows.
First of all, it must be pointed out that the percentage of participation varies from 10%o in mining to 20% in fishing and to 25% in
industrial and telecommunication enterprises. However, only part of this
share accrues directly and in cash to the personnel: in industrial enter.
prise 10% out of the 25%; in fishing enterprises 8% out of the 20%,
in mining 4% out of the 10%, and in telecommunications 10% out of the
25%. This part of the participation, called participacidn liquida, is
allocated half equally to all qualified members of the personnel, and half
proportionate to their earnings. In telecommunications, the 10% is
divided so that half belongs to the particular comunidad and the other
half to the Comunidad de Compensacin de Telecomunicaciones, to be
distributed among the comunidades proportionate to the number of their
members. With these contributions the comunidad will establish a londo
de participacidn Uquida and distribute it annually among its members,
half in equal parts and half proportionate to their earnings.
Second, in industrial enterprises the remaining part of the profits
to be shared represents participaci6npatrimonial (i.e., 15%) and will be
reinvested in the same enterprise through the particular comunidad
industrial according to a plan submitted by the enterprise. In case no
such plan is submitted or if the plan is not approved by the Ministry
of Industry and Commerce, the 15% will be invested by acquiring shares
"belonging to other partners or shareholders." The comunidad will continue receiving in turn non-transferable shares and other instruments of
participation, until such reinvestments reach 50% of the enterprise's
capital, at which time the "workers will be individually owners of the
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shares and participations... in accordance with the conditions of the...
comunidad industrial." This will be done by shares issued by the comunidad to its members. This is to be repeated every three years with the
new shares based on assets acquired from the enterprise during such a
period. In other enterprises, the particpaci6n patrimonial will be again
divided. In fishing enterprises the 12% will be reinvested and the shares
and participations so acquired will be divided: half retained by the
particular comunidad pesquera and half going to the Comunidad de
Compensaci6n Pesquera. In mining enterprises the 6% constituting the
participacidn patrimonial, is also reinvested and the shares or participations thus acquired divided so that one fifth remains with the particular
comunidad minera while four fifths go to the Comunidad de Compensa.
ci6n Minera, to be distributed among the comunidades proportionate
to the man-days of their members (dias-hombres laborales). In telecommunications the 25% is divided into 10% as participaciin liquida to
be distributed in cash, and 15% to be invested in bonds of the particular
enterprise or in valores issued by the Corporaci6nFinancierade Desarrollo
(COFIDE). Of the valores acquired by the 15% as participaci6n patrimonial half flows back to the particular comunidad while the other half
goes to the Comunidad de Compensaci6n de Telecomunicaciones which
will issue shares and distribute them among the comunidades according
to the number of their members.
Finally, in this scheme, the comunidades are, as it was just shown,
joined into the comunidades de compensaci6n established for the particular branch of the economy, to act as intermediate and equalizing
agencies.
The complicated mechanism of profit sharing is, in most jurisdictions,
supervised by appropriate administrative agencies. As expressed in the
1948 Colombian law, the control over profit sharing belongs exclusively
to the State (art. 31). However, it would seem that the interests of the
personnel directly involved would warrant some control on their part.
Yet it is interesting to find that not only have such controls not been
foreseen in most jurisdictions but have been expressly denied in others.
Venezuela (art. 95) and Mexico (Constitution, art. 129, IX, and art. 131
of the Federal Labor Law) deny that the right to share in profits implies
authority to intervene in the management or administration of the enterprise. On the contrary, in Peru the industrial comunidades have the
right to inspect all accounting books of the respective enterprises, through
officers representing the comunidad, who may be accompanied by any
member of the comunidad as well as by experts hired for such purpose
(Decreto.Ley No. 19.262, 1972, art. 40).
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It is surprising to find that the socialization schemes developing in
Latin America refrain from profit sharing. The present Chilean government expressed recently its opposition to such sharing. Instead, the
excess (excedentes), apparently meaning surplus of income over costs, as
"determined in conjunction with the branch of production shall not accrue
to individuals, but shall be accumulated for social purposes or distributed
as social benefits (socialmente capitalizados o repartidos en beneficios
sociales)."6S
In conclusion, it may be stated that the idea of profit sharing was
introduced in PeriA in 1948 as a vehicle toward "harmonious cooperation
between capital and labor, acting in perfect solidarity to the effect that
prosperity results in the betterment of those who work." Profit sharing
also serves to increase production of the worker by awarding higher
rewards and, finally as an incentive to stimulate their dedication and
effectiveness. However, these expectations have not been fulfilled. Due
partly to the uncertainties surrounding the making of a profit and to
the complexities of accounting procedures, many Latin American countries
have shifted from profit sharing to straight increases of earnings through
various kinds of bonuses, premiums and other remunerations. As already
indicated, Colombia has reduced its profit sharing plan of 1948 to optional
schemes. A similar development took place in Bolivia. It is also significant
that Perd has reduced direct participation to a small part of the profits
and entrusted the greater part of these to the comunidades.
(12) Representations. Once the status and power of the personnel
employed in an enterprise is recognized, a workable organ for its representation and activities must be found. 66 There are two types: the labor
unions and the various work councils (comitas de empresas). Both types
are recognized in Latin American countries, but in some only union
representation exists (e.g. Argentina, 67 Brazil, 68 Mixico, 69 and
Venezuela 70 ).
The other type, the work councils, do not represent particular members but the entire personnel of an enterprise. In Chile, for example,
employees, as dintinguished from workers, elect one delegate in enterprises with five or more employees to represent them before the employer
and before administrative agencies (Labor Code, art. 155). In Bolivia, 71
the delegates have been introduced in the mining industry in conjunction
with its nationalization (Decreto Supremo No. 3.586, 1953). They are
elected by the general assembly of the plant personnel to represent them
and to share in some managerial functions (infra 14). In their former
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capacity they supervise work in the enterprise, particularly prevention
of damage to the plant (art. 10, a), improper taking of plant property,
usurpation of unwarranted privileges, as well as prevention of acts of
sabotage (art. 10, b). As part of their duties they are required to report
such cases to the union or to the general assembly of the personnel (art.
10, c). Supreme Decree No. 02.117 (1950) has provided for optional
consejos rnixtos de empresa,72 their membership consisting of two labor
representatives (where there is a union, its delegates, art. 2), one representative of the employees and one member representing the employer
who also presides (art. 1). In Ecuador, the comiti de empresa is optional
in enterprises with more than 15 workers. It is elected by the personnel
(Labor Code, art. 423) and is charged with the following functions:
conclusion of collective agreements; defense of rights of the personnel;
working for the economic and social betterment of the personnel; and
representation in and out of court of personnel in "matters of interest
whenever workers do not press such claims themselves" (art. 425). The
comiti operates through its directiva, as an executive committee of the
asamblea general del comitg (art. 426).
In Cuba the Law of Labor Justice (No. 1.166, 1964) introduced
work committees in enterprises with more than 25 workers, their eligibility
being limited to those of "good socialist attitude toward work." Removable
by the Minister of Labor, they are supposed to intervene in conflicts
between workers and management and act in cases of violation of work
discipline whenever these are punishable by loss of wages. Other types of
councils have been set up in conjunction with the government sponsored
labor union, for example, advisory technical councils manned by members appointed by the management, to advise on production (Resolucidn
No. 16.782, 1960, amended by Resoluci6n No. 5.797, 1962); also mixed
grievance committees with two members from the personnel and two
from management, with an official of the Ministry of Labor presiding
(Law No. 1.072, 1962).71
Uruguay with its widely nationalized economy may be of particular
interest. The Constitution of 1967 (art. 65) provides for setting up personnel committees in autonomous entities to collaborate with the directors
"in the enforcement of the regulations, the study of budgetary requirements, the organization of services, of labor regulations and in the application of disciplinary measures." Furthermore, in public services administered directly by the State or by concessioners "competent organs
to hear disputes between authorities . . . and their employees, and to
consider methods and procedures by public authority to maintain continuous service" may be established (art. 65, para. 2).7'
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As it will be shown below, in Peru one of the functions of the
comunidades is to represent the personnel of the particular enterprise
75
in which they function.
(13) Comunidades. The various entities as designed to represent personnel still left it an amorphous aggregation of people employed in the
same enterprise. A significant innovation was introduced in Peru by a
series of enactments passed in 1970 and 1971.76 The personnel of enterprises covered by these laws are given the status of a body corporate, a
persona juridica de derecho privado, with its own organs, functions, and
assets. It performs a threefold function: it acts in a representative capacity;
performs a central role in the profit sharing scheme (supra 1), and opens
the way to personnel's codetermination, i.e., participation in the management (infra 14).
Comunidades are regulated for each of the economic areas covered
by the particular enactments. 77 Within their general functions, interesting
mutations may be detected in regard to the proprietary interests. Industrial
comunidades represent the personnel and administer assets accruing to
it (art. 23). The particular law dealing with industrial comunidades
(art. 2), expanded their purpose by stressing the strenghtening of the
enterprise by concerted actions of the personnel and the management not
only in the productive process, in property and reinvestment, but also
by protecting "rights and interests which the law [Decree-Law No.
18.350] grants to the personnel as owners." Furthermore, they administer assets which the comunidad receives in behalf of its members; and
finally, they promote advancement of the personnel (art. 3). Similarly,
comunidades in fishing enterprises represent the personnel and "participate in ownership, management, and benefits produced by the enterprise" (art. 64). Essentially the same purposes are given to comunidades
in mining enterprises (art. 273). However, the most recently created
comunidades in telecommunications represent the personnel and only
"participate in the management and benefits produced by the enterprise"
(art. 92), thus omitting previously mentioned proprietary interests.
As already summarized (supra 11), the comunidades perform an
essential function in the profit sharing scheme. The particular enactments
provide for their organization, membership, assets, adaptation to various
types of enterprises as well as liquidation, all too extensive and complex
to be. summarized within the scope of this study. It may only be repeated
here that, except in industry, comunidades are organized in comunidades
de compensaci6n,7 designed to "strengthen the solidarity of workers . . .

EMPRESA IN LATIN AMERICAN LAW

by equalizing the allocation of contributions they receive"
No. 18.810, 1971, art. 68).

(Decree-Law

(14) Codetermination (Cogestidn). In Latin America, forms of code.
termination, i.e., sharing by the personnel (or its representatives) in
the management of the enterprise developed mainly as a consequence of
nationalization 79 directed against foreign control rather than for reasons
of private property or social reform. Generally speaking, four different
ways to manage nationalized enterprises may be distinguished. The first
is a simple takeover by the State merging the enterprise with the public
administrative machinery, but retaining some degree of autonomy. The
second method is the operation of enterprises as State-owned or controlled corporations, with or without private (or even foreign) capital.
The third alternative is the operation of such enterprises under a concession by qualified private or semi-private concessioners. And finally,
there is the fourth possibility, i.e., a nationalized enterprise becomes the
property of and is managed by the personnel. In every one of these four
alternatives, the role of the personnel varies. The complete takeover by
the personnel (autogestidn, infra 15), puts the personnel into the shoes
of the "capitalist" owner unless restrained by planning, control and
general policy norms imposed by the State. In the other cases sketched
above, personnel representatives participate in the managing bodies of
the enterprises according to its legal status.5 0 Codetermination finds expression in two ways: one, it grants personnel a definite number of
representatives in the managing bodies; the other also grants representation, but makes it dependent on the amount of invested capital owned
or controlled by the personnel. This is the case in Peru. As already
shown, part of the profits is reinvested in the enterprise as shares or
other types of a participation acquired by the comunidad until its share
of the invested capital reaches 50%. The amount of capital held by the
conunidad will increase its representation in the managing body of the
enterprise.
After nationalizing the oil industry, Mexico set up an administration
(Acuerdo, March 30, 1938) vesting power in the Consejo Administrativo
del Petrdleo, consisting of nine members of whom three were labor's
representatives from the oil workers' union. A similar scheme was used
following the nationalization of the railways.81 When in 1952, Bolivia
nationalized foreign controlled mining (tin) enterprises (Supreme Decree
No. 3.223, 1952), what is called control obrero was instituted calling
upon the miners' delegates to act on the level of the local administration
(art. 17). The scope of the scheme was subsequently developed by Supreme
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Decree No. 3.586 (1953)' granting miners' delegates the right to such
participation and to participate and vote in the local management bodies
of the Corporacidn Minera de Bolivia (COMINBOL). Consequently, the
delegate has the opportunity to familiarize himself with all aspects of
the enterprise, including inspection of books. He is also entitled to intervene in sales contracts involving consumer goods and local transportation, among others, in order to "confirm that prices and conditions
are the most favorable." The delegate may also supervise the distribution
of merchandise in company stores, intervene in hiring and firing of
workers, check work sheets, explosives, safety installations, and make
suggestions for improvements (art. 11). His main weapon is the right
of veto (art. 15) in matters listed in art. 16, but never in technical
matters (art. 17). On the higher managerial level (Directorio Central)
workers are represented by two directors appointed by the government
from among three candidates submitted by the labor union (art. 4).
Recently, personnel representatives have been included in a board of
directors in Argentina. The Servicios ElIctricos del Gran Buenos Aires,
S. A. (SEGBA), have been intervened by the.State under Law No. 19.139
(1971), but the intervention ceased after the corporation, operating with
a majority State participation, amended its charter to include in its
board of directors representatives of the personnel of all three groups,
managing staff, employees as well as workers, a change approved by
Law. No. 19.573 (1972).
Conversely, Cuba has stayed away from control obrero; it does not
even appear in the nationalization decrees8 2 affecting approximately 50,000
enterprises allotted to various ministries and other state agencies with
the power to appoint directors, apparently in cooperation with the
C.D.R. (Comitis de Delensa de la Revoluciin), the block-type committees
supporting the regime. As already indicated, the work councils (Law of
Labor Justice) do not participate in management and neither do the government sponsored labor unions.
Quite different are the developments in Chile since 1968. The constitutional amendment of 1971 provides that for the nationalized copper industry the Legislature shall consider workers' participation in the management
and administration of the newly reorganized mining enterprises. These
initiatives found expression in a number of organizational decrees issued
by the Ministry of Mining. One of them, involving the Comnpahia de Cobre
Chuquicanw.at 3 (December 27, 1971, D.O. December 30, 1971) provides
an example. An administrative council is set up (art. 1) to manage the
enterprise, composed of six representatives of the State, appointed by the
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President; six representatives of workers are elected by direct vote, and
one additional presidential appointee presides (art. 2). Decisions are
adopted by simple majority (art. 5). The Council approves, among others,
investments, production, and operations "within guidelines established by
the Corporaci6n del Cobre"; it "sets policies for the management of the
enterprise"; supervises operations; appoints and removes the personnel,
and enters into contracts on behalf of the enterprise (art. 5). The subsequent Norms for the Coordination of the Administrative Regime of Nationalized Copper Enterprises (D.O. July 15, 1972) emphasize (art. 5) that
workers will "participate in the direcci6n, administraci6nand gestiin of
the enterprises to the widest extent, and in conformity with laws and
regulations in force or to be promulgated." Particularly they shall "participate in the discussion and formulation of policies for the enterprise and
in plans involving investments, production, and operations." Moreover,
the executive officers of the enterprise shall "account publicly, before the
workers, for the way production and financing of the enterprise is going."
Within the scope of the Gran Minerta del Cobre and the Empresa Nacional
Minera which will own 95% and 5%, respectively, of the capital (art. 4),
the administrative council of the enterprise will be composed of eleven
members: four appointed by the President and representing the Corpora,
citn del Cobre, one, also appointed by the President, representing the
Empresa Nacional de Mineria, both responsible to these corporations, respectively; five elective workers' representatives, and one member again
appointed by the President to serve as president of the enterprise and at
the same time its director (gerente general). In any case, elective representatives of the personnel are in the minority.
The constitutional amendment submitted in 197294 and adopted by
both Chambers of the Legislature, contains significant innovations. It
attempts to guarantee workers' participation in all three classes of enter.
prises, the social (State operated), the mixed and the private; further.
more, a law shall enable workers to own and operate enterprises regardless
of the sector of the economy to which they belong; and as owners, they
shall enjoy the assets and share in the profits. The amendment was blocked
by a presidential veto ss which contains specific statements of governmental
policies in regard to codetermination:
The Government favors a most extensive system of incorporating
workers in the administration of enterprises in the social as well
as in the mixed area under State control. It also accepts that
workers manage for their own account certain enterprises provided these enterprises do not involve essential economic activi-
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ties which must be reserved to the State; furthermore, workers
must not own means of production as their private property.
In regard to the organization, the Government sees in the assembly
of workers the "highest organ of participation at the base," to discuss
plans and policies "in accordance with the general directives of national
planning"; to elect representatives of the personnel to the administrative
bodies of the enterprises; and to "censure such representatives." Special
assemblies are anticipated for "sections, departments, divisions and other
production units." The other type shall be production committees on the
level of special assemblies. As to the relationship between the State and
personnel representatives, the Government demands a majority of State
representatives in enterprises operating in social areas, i.e., areas of eminent
State interest. In mixed areas under the control of the State workers'
participation shall be effectuated by the "designation of representatives
before the management organs." Finally, in mixed enterprises, i.e., with
State capital participation, administrative councils may function side by
side with the traditional corporate organs; their decisions shall be binding
on the State and on the workers' representatives sitting on the board of
directors.
As shown above, some of these schemes have already been enacted for
the copper mining industry.
In Peru the personnel participates in the management of industrial,
fishing, mining and telecommunications enterprises through their comunidades. The particular laws and regulations secure the representatives seats
on the managing bodies of the enterprises: in industrial (art. 25) ; fishing
(art. 79, Regulation art. 207), and mining (art. 291) at least one, and in
telecommunications two members (art. 106). However, their numbers will
increase corresponding to the capital reinvested in the enterprise, as already
pointed out, until such capital participation reaches 50%. In principle,
these members enjoy the same rights and are bound by the same duties
and limitations as are other members of such bodies. According to the Law
on Comunidad Industrial they must vote at the general corporate assemblies as well as at the board meetings as a unit according to the number
of shares they hold (art. 45).
(15) Self.management (autogesti6n). The idea that labor must become
the owner of the means of production used in the performance of work
would, if strictly applied, lead to a complete and exclusive takeover of
enterprises by their personnel. 87 In one or another organizational form, the
personnel would be not only the owner and entrepreneur, but also the
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employer while remaining, at the same time, as the employee. Thus the
functions presently distributed in the operation of an enterprise would
merge in one hand. However, even countries where the whole economy or
substantial segments thereof are publicly owned and managed, have shied
away from autogesti6 n.
There have been in Latin America takeovers of enterprises by the
personnel; in most of these cases not for the purpose of owning and managing them hut rather as protests or political pressure, i.e., provoke the State
to intervene (e.g., Chile). In one instance, however, the State took over an
enterprise and handed it to the personnel to manage it. This happened in
Peru, not for social or economic reasons but to silence a publishing enterprise opposed to the military government. The enterprise was expropriated
by a decree.law (No. 16.169, 1970), to be taken over by a cooperative
formed from volunteers among employees charged to continue publication
(art. 4). Until the cooperative was formed, the assets had to be held by an
ad hoc committee constituted by the newspapermen and printers unions
(art. 5). The cooperative had to pay for the assets; in the meantime, the
nominal value of the corporate shares was deposited with the Banco de la
Naci6n, until the courts determined the value of the shares as well as that
of the assets of the corporation (art. 6).
The present Chilean government has, as already indicated, voiced88
its opposition to "workers' individual ownership of means of production of
the enterprises." It is indeed difficult to imagine how thousands of workers
employed in a modem enterprise could individually own particular assets
of the enterprise where they work. In any case, the Government is willing
to allow workers to "manage for their own account certain enterprises,"
provided they are not "engaged in essential economic activities which must
be reserved to the State."
Finally Cuba. the most orthodox exponent of Marxism in the Hemisphere, plagued by the fact that in 1970 only 32% of the population was
economically active, and absenteeism accounted for 10% to 20% of the
working hours lost,3 9 is drifting increasingly away from any form of
autogestidntoward a military type of discipline. 90
(III)

CONCLUSIONS

The legal structure of enterprises has, in the last half century, experi.
enced but few substantial innovations even though in many instances the
legal title has shifted from private, individual or associative entrepreneurs
to public entities. The only innovation, the individual enterprise with lim-
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ited liability may be, for all practical purposes, discounted as a viable
institution. Thus the traditional associative types continue-even in countries
with strong tendencies toward statism, i.e., a regime giving the State a
preponderant role in the economy as the owner of the means of production
or as the planner regulating the distribution of goods produced. Even there
the structure of enterprises follows, except where transformed into administrative agencies, in most cases corporate patterns with managerial prerogatives based on the control of the participating public or private capital.
On the part of the personnel, the idea of profit sharing has gained
acceptance without affecting the status of the enterprise; in most cases
such sharing is limited to privately operated units. Only one country in the
Hemisphere has designed such participation to bring, at the final stage,
half of the invested capital, at least indirectly, under the control of the
personnel as workers' shares. Conversely, countries with socialist leanings
reject profit sharing and manage enterprises with minority personnel representation, if any. In most Latin American countries labor unions remain the
dominant type of labor representation participating in the management
whenever it is made possible by law.
Some Latin American countries have gone quite far in their reformist
fervor. However, the great majority of the republics, particularly the most
prosperous, consider such efforts with skepticism if not with outright mistrust, not only in view of their ideological background but also because of
their economic failures in the Hemisphere and abroad. Nor does it remain
unnoticed that such reforms have engulfed countries plagued by inherent
social and economic disadvantages, in the belief that the present day
miracle maker, the State, will give what people have learned to expect.
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